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The Right to Trial by Jury in State Court Prosecutions
Duncan was charged with simple battery which, under Louisiana law,'
was a misdemeanor having a maximum punishment of two years imprison-
ment and a $300 fine. Timely request for a trial by jury was made, but
because Louisiana law' provided for jury trials only in cases in which cap-
ital punishment, life imprisonment, or imprisonment at hard labor may be
imposed, the request was denied. Duncan was convicted of the charge.
He was sentenced to serve sixty days in prison and was fined $150. In his
appeal to the United States Supreme Court' Duncan maintained that he
had been denied his right to trial by jury' as guaranteed by the fourteenth
amendment to the United States Constitution." Held, reversed: The right
to trial by jury is a right fundamental to the American scheme of justice
and is guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment in all state criminal pros-
ecutions which would come within the sixth amendment's guarantee of a
jury trial were they tried in a federal court. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968).
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO
TRIAL BY JURY IN THE STATES
The Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. From the earliest cases
involving the interpretation of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution, the Supreme Court has maintained that the amend-
ment was not intended to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights. In Twining
v. New Jersey' the Court stated that although the personal rights contained
in the Bill of Rights may be safeguarded against state action, "it is not be-
cause those rights are enumerated in the first eight amendments, but be-
cause they are of such a nature that they are included in the conception of
due process of law .... " Subsequent to Twining, the Court began to rec-
1LA. REV. STAT. § 14:35 (1950).
'LA. CONST. art. I, 5 9; art. Xll, S 41; LA. CODE Cime. Pioc. ANN. art. 779 (1966).
" Appellant's appeal to the United States Supreme Court was pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1964); the Court noted probable jurisdiction in 389 U.S. 809 (1962).
" "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury . U.S. CONST.
art. III, S 2. "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial. jury. ... U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
" "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, 5 1.
' Evidence supporting the concept that Congress intended the incorporation of at least the first
eight amendments was presented in the appendix to Justice Black's dissent in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). An extensive rebuttal to Justice Black's opinion may be found in Fairman,
Does the Fourteenth Amendiment Incorporate the Bill of Rights: The Original Understanding, 2
STAN. L. REv. 5 (1949). See generally Frankfurter, Memorandum on "Incorporation" of the Bill
of Rights Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HAv. L. REV. 746
(1965); Note, Constitutional Lau-Was It Intended That the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights?, 42 N.C.L. REv. 925 (1964).
'211 U.S. 78 (1908).
a The Court's conception of fourteenth amendment due process of law as it existed at that time
had been clearly defined in the earlier case of Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884), as
that law of the land in each State, which derives its authority from the inherent and
reserved powers of the State, exerted within the limits of those fundamental princi-
ples of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institu-
tions, and the greatest security for which resides in the right of the people to make
their own laws, and alter them at their pleasure.
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ognize specific rights as protected against state infringement." Relying on
"natural law" principles, the Court in Palko v. Connecticut" noted that
certain rights were "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and should
therefore be absorbed into the concept of due process of law.1 This natural
law theory was affirmed ten years later in Adamson v. California," al-
though in that case the Court held that the particular Bill of Rights pro-
vision in question was not within the meaning of due process.'
Since Adamson, however, cases concerning the fourteenth amendment
have evidenced a trend away from the natural law theory and toward a
doctrine of "selective incorporation." During this period, the Court has
held that the fourteenth amendment guarantees against state infringement,
the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment," the rights to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures and to have illegally seized evidence
excluded from criminal trials," the right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination,' the rights to counsel," and to a speedy" and public1 ' trial,
the right to confront opposing witnesses," and the right to compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses."' As a result of the selective incorporation doc-
trine the Court has concerned itself not only with whether the state court's
proceedings meet the demands of fundamental fairness which due process
embodies, but also whether the proceedings meet the standards of the par-
ticular Bill of Rights provision as it has been interpreted by the Court.
Thus under the selective incorporation doctrine as currently applied by
the Court, federal standards are imposed in state as well as federal courts."
The Fourteenth Amendnent and the Right to Trial by Jury. The relation
of the right to trial by jury and the concept of due process of law has been
considered by the Court on several occasions. In Maxwell v. Dow" the
Court faced the question of whether the sixth amendment requires a jury
of twelve persons in state court prosecutions. The Court noted that al-
though a twelve-man jury is required in the federal courts by virtue of the
sixth amendment," the right to trial by jury "has never been affimaed to
be a requisite of due process of law."" The Court further stated that the
'Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion); Dejonge v.
Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly); Hamilton v. Board of Regents of University
of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (freedom of religion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (freedom of speech).
,0302 U.S. 319 (1937).
"Id. at 325.
A"332 U.S. 46 (1947).
"5The Court in Adamson held that "the due process clause does not protect, by virtue of its
mere existence, the accused's freedom from giving testimony by compulsion in state trials that is
secured to him against federal interference by the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 54.
"Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
"3 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
1a Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (overruled Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947)).
" Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 284 (1964).
"Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
" In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
"Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965), noted in 19 Sw. L.J. 632 (1965).
"Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
"Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
"176 U.S. 581 (1900).
"Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898).
"Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. S81, 603 (1900).
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right to a jury trial is "a case of self-protection, and the people can be
trusted to look out and care for themselves.""
Although the case of Snyder v. Massachusetts" did not squarely involve
the question of the right to trial by jury, the Court stated that such a right
was not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty and should not
be "ranked as fundamental. 2 8 Similar dicta contained in Palko v. Connec-
ticut" indicated not only that the right to trial by jury was not essential,
but also that the states could abolish it altogether. In recent years, how-
ever, the Court has shown an increasing tendency to recognize the right
to trial by jury as fundamental and essential.' This fact, in conjunction
with the Court's ever changing standards of due process of law," set the
stage for the reconsideration of the right to a jury trial in Duncan v.
Louisiana.
II. DUNCAN v. LOUISiANA-A NEW FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
Speaking for the majority in Duncan, Justice White stated that the
Court now considers the right to trial by jury in serious criminal cases
"fundamental to the American scheme of justice.""" The Court at first at-
tempted to reconcile this holding with its prior decisions in Maxwell,
Palko, and Snyder' by stating that in these earlier cases the Court merely
examined whether a "civilized system" could be imagined which did not
guarantee the right in question. In Duncan, however, the Court inquired
as to whether the right was essential to the Anglo-American regime of or-
dered liberty. While the validity of this distinction is questionable in light
of the Court's own words in the earlier decisions," the effect of this appar-
ent weakness in the Court's opinion was nullified when Justice White,
apparently changing his mind in mid-opinion, unequivocably rejected the
contrary dicta of Palko and Snyder. Reasoning that the right to trial by
jury was intended to provide protection against oppression by the govern-
ment, the Court concluded "that in the American States, as in the federal
judicial system, a general grant of jury trial for serious offenses is a funda-
s Id. at 605.
"1291 U.S. 97 (1934).
old. at 105.
"s 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937).
aslrvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11
(1955).
"'Edwards, Due Process of Law in Criminal Cases, 57 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S. 130, 131 (1966).
'Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
'See text accompanying notes 23-29 rupra.
"The Court has, in the past, referred to "those principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions." Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884)
(emphasis added). Even more notable were the words in Snyder and Palko where the Court based
its decisions on the "principles of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental." E.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (emphasis
added); see text accompanying notes 26-28 supra. The Court in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967),
in its discussion of the American system of justice omitted any mention of trial by jury as an
essential right. In light of Gault and the wording used by the Court in Hurtado, Snyder, and
Palko, one might fairly question whether the Court was, as Justice White stated, only considering
"imaginary and theoretical schemes" of justice and not the American system. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968).
NOTES1968]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 22
mental right, essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assur-
ing that fair trials are provided for all defendants."'
Having concluded that the right to trial by jury in criminal cases is fun-
damental to the American scheme of justice and is therefore protected from
infringement by the states, the Court examined the notable exception to
this right. The Court has long recognized that there is no right to trial by
jury in prosecutions of petty offenses." However, faced with the absence
of definitive constitutional standards"' as to what constitutes a serious of-
fense, the Court has turned to the maximum penalty that may be im-
posed as an objective criterion of seriousness."' In the federal courts Con-
gress has provided that no crime carrying a maximum penalty of impris-
onment for six months or less is a serious offense." In Duncan, however, the
Court declined to specify a clear delineation between petty and serious
offenses. It merely stated that the possible two-year sentence under the
Louisiana simple battery statute was of sufficient length to guarantee Dun-
can the right to a jury trial.
III. DUNCAN IN PERSPECTIVE
In previous cases involving the doctrine of selective incorporation the
Court has generally applied the same interpretation of the constitutional
right in both the state and federal courts.'e The Court in Duncan indicated
just such a policy when Justice White stated that the right to trial by
jury must be guaranteed in all criminal cases "which--were they to be
"Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 157-58 (1968).
"Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617 (1937); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
'7 Compare the exact standards for the right to trial by jury in civil cases provided in the
seventh amendment: "In suits at common law, where the value shall exceed twenty dollars, the
right to trial by jury shall be preserved .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
"District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S.
65 (1904). In Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968), a companion case to Duncan, the Court
held that the Constitution guarantees a right to trial by jury in trials of serious criminal con-
tempt. As in Duncan, the Court in Bloom looked to the penalty involved to determine the serious-
ness of the offense. Bloom is notable not only in that it makes a jury trial available to a defendant
accused of a serious contempt, but also because the Court looked to the penalty actually imposed
when no maximum penalty was prescribed by law. Bloom, however, like Duncan involved a two-year
sentence so that the Court shed no new light on the difference between petty and serious offenses.
8 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). In Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 554 (1888), the Court said that
"Congress has the right to provide for the trial ...by a court without a jury, of such offenses
as were, by the laws and usages in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, triable
without a jury .... Although petty offenses were tried summarily both in England and in the
American colonies, there was never a clear standard for determining the criteria of serious offenses.
The choice of six months' imprisonment as a division between petty and serious offenses was an
attempt by Congress to codify the most common historical standard. Of this historical approach
to the question, one source notes that "history presents a body of experience expressive of the judg-
ment of its time, but does not save Congress nor the Supreme Court from the necessity for judg-
ment in giving past history present application." Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses
and the Constitutional Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 39 HARv. L. REv. 917, 982 (1926).
40 Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). One noted
judge, critical of this practice, has commented that the "real bite" of the selective incorporation
process is that "once a particular provision of the Bill of Rights makes the grade for 'absorption,'
it comes over to the states with all the overlays the Court has developed in applying it to the fed-
eral government . . . ." Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF.
L. REv. 929, 933 (1965). On the other hand, the Court defends this policy on the basis that to
allow the federal standards to be "watered down" would be to allow the states "greater latitude
than the Federal Government to abridge concededly fundamental liberties protected by the Con-
stitution." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 413 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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tried in a federal court-would come within the Sixth Amendment's guar-
antee."' From this statement it may be inferred that any crime having a
maximum penalty of imprisonment for more than six months should be
regarded as serious." The Court went on to state, however, that it would
not settle the exact division between petty and serious offenses. Nor did
the Court further define the limits of the sixth amendment as applied in
the federal courts."
In a concurring opinion Justice Black restated the reasoning which he
so clearly espoused in his dissent to Adamson v. California." He also re-
futed a number of arguments against his "total incorporation" doctrine and
noted that the selective incorporation process has already operated to in-
corporate most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Justice Harlan, on
the other hand, dissented to the Court's opinion with reasoning equally as
familiar" as that of Justice Black. In addition to echoing his well known
objections to the incorporation process, Justice Harlan stated that, even
accepting this process, the right to trial by jury is not fundamental to pro-
cedural fairness. He further stated that there is no reason "why this court
should reverse the conviction of the appellant, absent any suggestion that
his particular trial was in fact unfair, or compel the State of Louisiana to
afford jury trial in an as yet unbounded category of cases that can, without
unfairness, be tried to a court."
IV. CONCLUSION
While the decision in Duncan is commendable in that it protects a fun-
damental right, several questions remain unanswered. The immediate
issue"" which the Court must decide is whether the interpretation of the
'Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (emphasis added).
4 Since Congress has provided a statutory division between petty and serious crimes, the Court
has been relieved of the burden of determining this division. While the Court must now decide
the question with respect to the state courts, it would appear that it would require a severe de-
parture from the historical approach taken by both Congress and the Court, see note 39 supra,
if the division between petty and serious offenses is to be other than six months' imprisonment.
'Not discussed by the Court are the federal requirements that the jury be composed of twelve
persons, Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343 (1898); that it be impartial and drawn from a cross
section of the community, Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); and that it not be instructed
by the judge to reach a specific verdict, Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614 (1894).
" 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947).
'See Klopfer v. California, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (concurring opinion); Griffin v. Califor-
nia, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (concurring opinion); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965)
(concurring opinion); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 14 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Kerr v. Cali-
fornia, 374 U.S. 23, 44 (1963) (concurring opinion); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 672 (1961)
(dissenting opinion).
" Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 190 (1968).
4In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), the Court held that the decisions in Duncan
and Bloom would not be applied retroactively. The Court considered three factors in reaching its
decision: "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the administration of
justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297
(1967). For cases in which the Court has set different standards to be considered in determining
the retroactive application of a decision see Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Tehan
v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965). In DeStefano the
Court noted that the retroactive application of Duncan would require the retrial of all persons
convicted by a procedure not in accordance with the Court's interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment. While the Court concluded that the "values implemented by the right to trial by jury"
would not be significantly furthered by a retroactive application of Dunca, the reasoning behind
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sixth amendment presently applied in the federal courts"s will also be ap-
plied to the states.' Such an application would require many changes in
state court procedure.' The question may well be asked what effect these
changes would have on the administration of justice at the state level."' It
has been noted that jurisdictions that have previously expanded the right
to trial by jury have caused local courts to become hopelessly clogged."'
Louisiana has taken immediate legislative steps to avoid just such a result."
A further repercussion of an application of the federal standards to the
state courts would be the inability of the states to "experiment" with the
jury procedure in an effort to find a just, yet efficient, judicial system. In
this regard, however, a strong argument is made by many authorities that,
despite the importance of efficient judicial administration, limiting trial
by jury in favor of trial by judge is not a just means of obtaining such
efficiency." It might well be asked whether the best aid to judicial admin-
istrative problems consistent with the Court's concept of fundamental jus-
tice as expressed in Duncan might not be to guarantee the right to trial by
jury, in accordance with the federal standards, in state criminal trials
where a maximum penalty of one year imprisonment may be imposed. It
could then be left to the legislature and courts of each state, where local
needs and philosophies can best be balanced, to determine the jury trial
rights in the prosecution of offenses which involve a less serious penalty.
Lyman G. Hughes
this conclusion is not clearly explained. DeStefano v. Wood, supra at 634. Notable also is the
Court's failure to distinguish Duncan and Bloom from those cases which have been held to apply
retroactively. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), noted in 18 Sw. L.J. 729 (1964);
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1964); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
u See note 43 supra.
U A strong indication that the federal statidards will be applied to the states may be found in
the fact that the Court did not deny Louisianas assertion that the states will be obliged to comply
with the past interpretations of the sixth amendment. In response to the contention that such a
policy would require widespread changes in stite criminal processes the Court merely noted that
its decisions interpreting the sixth amendment are always open to reconsideration. Duncan v. Louisi-
ana, 391 U.S. 145, 158 n.30 (1968). In a concurring opinion to Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194,
214 (1968), Mr. Justice Fortas argued that unless the Court "slavishly adheres to the incorpora-
tion theory, body and substance" there is no reason why not only the sixth amendment, but also
its "bag and baggage" must be imposed upon the states.
5* The State of New York previously distinguished between petty and serious offenses by whether
the prosecution had to be initiated by indictment. A recent decision from that state has held that,
in light of Duncan, the seriousness of an offense must be based on the maximum penalty involved
and that the "indictment criterion" is no longer applicable. The court went on to hold that a
misdemeanor punishable by one year imprisonment was a serious offense by contemporary standards
and "existing laws and practices in the nation." People v. Bowman, 3 CRnM. L. REP. 2496 (N.Y.
County Crim. Ct. Sept. 10, 1968). See generally Hood, Recent Developments: Trial by Jury, 20
ALA. L. REV. 76 (1967).
" For a discussion of the need for more efficient judicial administration see Kennedy, Crime
in the Cities: Improving the Administration of Criminal Justice, 58 J. CarM. L.C. & P.S. 142
(1967).
" Before the decision in State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959), expanding
the right to jury trials in Minnesota courts, the Minneapolis Municipal Court was three months
behind its calendar; after the decision it fell to two years behind the calendar. Note, Right to Jury
Trial for Persons Accused of an Ordinance Violation, 47 MINN. L. REy. 93, 105 (1962).
" For a general description of the steps taken by the Louisiana legislature to avoid a flood of
jury trial cases see Times-Picayune (New Orleans), July 11, 1968, S 1, at 14, col. 1.
"See generally Powell, Jury Trial of Crimes, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1 (1966).
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